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NOTE

Reconsidering the U.S. Patent
System: Lessons from Generics
ABSTRACT

Scholars and pharmaceutical industry representatives
consider the United States a worldwide leader in
pharmaceutical innovation. However, the recent expansion of
the internationalgenerics market has threatened the strength of
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. The pressure has led to the
U.S. market's overreliance on a patentability standard that
blocks generics competition without contributing substantially
to the state of the art. This Note contrasts the U.S.
nonobviousness standard and patent linkage regime with those
of generics giants India and Israel and considers the effects of
these policies on the relevant national and international
generics industries. This Note proposes that the United States
revise its current approach to patent protection of
pharmaceuticals by adopting a heightened nonobviousness
standardand lengthening the availablepatent-term-restoration
period through modifications to the linkage regime. Only by
balancing these two legal mechanisms will the United States
maintain its status as the international leader in blockbuster
pharmaceuticals.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Many people criticize brand-name drug manufacturers in the
U.S. pharmaceutical industry for monopolizing drug therapies,
thereby limiting global access to life-saving drugs.' The United States
encourages high-risk research and development in the industry by
ensuring strong intellectual property protection of pharmaceutical
technologies domestically through (1) a relatively low standard of
nonobviousness for patentability, and (2) the ability to extend the life
of a patent beyond the standard term. 2 These pro-patent tools are
intended to reduce the inherent risks associated with costly drug
development, motivating U.S. manufacturers to continue advancing

1.
See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 241-43, 252 (2008), for a discussion and criticism of how the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry has come under attack.
2.
See discussion infra Parts II.A, III.A, IV.A (outlining the nonobviousness
standard and patent linkage regime in the United States and how they influence the
pharmaceutical industry).
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in the field. 3 Indeed, the United States has evolved into a
pharmaceutical giant, with its manufacturers today producing brandname drugs and technology available in the international
marketplace. 4 Meanwhile, patient populations in less wealthy
countries often cannot afford to pay the prices necessary to support
the costs of developing pioneer pharmaceutical therapies. 5 Thus,
many believe that the U.S. nonobviousness standard 6 and patent7
term-extension program need readjustment.
In 1995, members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
signed the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), which sets forth standardized measures for
securing and enforcing patent protection. 8 The agreement seeks to
promote international trade while recognizing the "special needs" of
developing countries. 9 Among other considerations, TRIPS requires
that a patentable invention be new, involve an "inventive step," and
be "capable of industrial application."' 10 More controversially, the
agreement allows developing countries to impose compulsory licenses
on pharmaceutical patents, thereby giving these countries a means to
provide medication to citizens that are unable to afford brand-name

3.

See discussion infra Part IV.A.
See, e.g., STUART 0. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND
POLICY 21-23 (2d ed. 2007) (describing how the United States has been the world's
leading innovator in internationally accepted drugs for the past twenty years).
5.
See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supranote 1, at 243 (discussing how patent holders
can price drugs so that only the wealthy can afford them).
6.
E.g., Yi-Chen Su, What About Know-How: Heightened Obviousness and
Lowered Disclosure Is Not a Panaceato the American Patent System for Biotechnology
Medication and Pharmaceutical Inventions in the Post-KSR ERA, 14 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 321, 323-26 (2010) (criticizing the industry-specific approach to
nonobviousness as it is applied by the courts).
7.
See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 212-15 (referencing the HatchWaxman Act and detailing the public resentment directed toward the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry as a result of perceived monopolization of drug therapies).
Patent-term extension, also referred to as patent-term restoration, enables
pharmaceutical developers to extend the patent term on pioneer drugs. See infra note
93 and accompanying text.
8.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
9.
Id. The preamble sets forth the WTO's "[diesir[e] to reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade" while "[rlecognizing also the special needs of the
least-developed country Members." Id. (emphasis omitted).
10.
Id. at 311. The agreement defines "inventive step" and "capable of
industrial application" as synonymous with the U.S. terms "non-obvious" and "useful."
Id. at 311 n.5. Members may exclude from patentability inventions that are necessary
to maintain public order and morality, such as for protection of human life or health.
Id. at 311. TRIPS does not further define the meaning of "inventive step," but instead
leaves the determination to the member countries. Id. at 311 n.5.
4.
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medications.1 1 A later WTO agreement extended this policy, allowing
12
compulsory licensees to supply drugs to foreign markets.
Despite widespread adoption of TRIPS, there remains great
variation among countries' patent policies. On one end, the United
States, by supporting "follow-on" patents and evergreening practices,
has allowed pharmaceutical giants to effectively extend their
monopolies on brand-name drugs. 1 3 Furthermore, the country has
implemented a linkage regime that requires burgeoning generics
manufacturers to enter into high-cost litigation proceedings in order
to move their product to market. 14 As generics manufacturers gain an
increasing presence in the international marketplace, U.S.
pharmaceutical companies have relied on these pro-patent tools to
shift focus away from research and development toward merely
maintaining a status quo and protecting existing technologies against
follow-on patents brought by a competitor. 15 However, this system is
not self-sustaining and ultimately requires a shift back toward a
steady output of blockbuster products.
Other countries, however, do not necessarily endorse follow-on
patents and patent linkage regimes. For example, India has firmly
rejected a patent linkage regime,' 6 and the country recently upset
U.S. pharmaceutical company Bayer when it issued its first
compulsory license. 17 And despite Israel's implementation of a patent

11.
See id. at 313-14 (stipulating that a developed country must grant a
nonexclusive license when either (1) the person applying for the license first attempted
to negotiate a voluntary license, or (2) there is a national emergency).
12.
See Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph6 of the
Doha Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 2, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30,
2003), available at http:H/www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips-e/implem-para6_e.htm
(extending the TRIPS license obligations waiver to exports under certain conditions).
13.
Follow-on patents claim derivative technologies that provide only minor
innovative changes. Ron A. Bouchard et al., Structure-Function Analysis of Global
PharmaceuticalLinkage Regulations, 12 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 391, 416 (2011). Such
technologies typically preserve the gist of the primary patent by retaining the same
active ingredient and general delivery technique while varying factors such as dosage,
inactive ingredients, and carrier. Id. The strategy of filing follow-on patents is known
as "evergreening" and results in an effectively perpetual extension of a monopoly on the
pioneer patent, as each patent term is strategically staggered. See generally JOHN R.
THOMAS, PATENT "EVERGREENING": ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 4 (2009),

available at http://ipmall.info/hostedresources/crs/R40917_091113.pdf (summarizing
the criticisms of the U.S. patent system and its tendency to support follow-on patents).
14.
See Bouchard et al., supra note 13, at 398-99 (discussing interaction
between the U.S. linkage regime and litigation).
15.
See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry's
shift toward follow-on technologies.
16.
See infra Part III.B for a discussion of India's High Court decision in Bayer
Corp. v. Union of India.
17.
See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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linkage regime, its patent-term restoration is inadequate. 18 The
variation in patent systems creates tension between countries and
frustrates the purpose of the TRIPS agreement.
This Note compares and contrasts the patent policies of the
United States, India, and Israel in the context of the pharmaceutical
industry and proposes a combination of policies that together should
ensure the continued development and availability of pharmaceutical
products. Part II investigates the nonobviousness patentability
requirement or its equivalent in each of the three countries. Part III
explores whether each country has implemented a patent linkage
regime and analyzes the effects of such implementation or lack
thereof. Part IV determines (1) the effect of each country's policies on
its domestic generics industry and (2) each policy's effects on the
international pharmaceutical trade. Finally, Part V proposes that the
United States should implement a heightened standard for
overcoming the nonobviousness bar while expanding the duration of
patent-term extension offered to pioneer pharmaceutical technologies
through the patent linkage regime.

II.

THE IMPACT OF NONOBVIOUSNESS ON PATENT VALIDITY

In order for an inventor to obtain patent protection on an
invention in any country, the inventor must first overcome the hurdle
known alternatively as nonobviousness, inventive step, or inventive
level. Under the TRIPS agreement, member countries have the
flexibility to define "inventive step." 19 Thus, the standard for
interpreting whether an invention is obvious varies from country to
country. For example, in the United States, § 103 of the American
Patent Act instructs that an invention is nonobvious when, taken as a
whole, it would not be obvious to a "person having ordinary skill in
the art" (PHOSITA) at the time of invention.20 While the current U.S.
patent system applies its nonobviousness requirement relatively
loosely, allowing applicants to protect trivial distinctions between

18.
See Malini Aisola, PhRMA Pushes for Data Exclusivity in 2010 Special 201
Comments, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L (Mar. 1, 2010, 4:11 PM), http://keionline.org/
node/789 (describing the limitations of Israel's extended exclusivity terms).
19.
See TRIPS, supra note 8, at 311 n.5 (explaining the term "inventive step"
can be deemed equivalent to words such as "non-obvious" and "useful").
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). This statutory standard has not been
20.
substantially changed by the recent enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284
(amending § 103 to reflect that under the first-inventor-to-file system, the filing date is
the appropriate time frame for determining the skill and knowledge of a person having
ordinary skill in the art). The minor provisions to nonobviousness will take effect on
March 16, 2013, eighteen months after enactment. Id. at § 3(n).
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technologies, India and Israel raise the bar so high that development
of pharmaceutical products becomes impractical.
A. In the United States
In the United States, judges typically take an industry-specific
approach and lower the bar for nonobviousness in the biotechnology
and pharmaceutical fields. 21 One explanation for this behavior is that
courts may be actively relaxing the nonobviousness bar for
pharmaceutical inventions in response to policy rationales. Bringing
a drug to market is an extremely expensive endeavor, 22 and
pharmaceutical laboratories typically must demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood of success in order to obtain research funding. 23 However, if
likelihood of success correlates with obviousness, the drug may not be
patentable. Thus, institutions investigating potential drug solutions
find themselves in a catch twenty-two, where patent protection is
only available in scenarios where they are incapable of obtaining
research funding to develop the technology. By lowering the bar for
the pharmaceutical sector, courts can promote the development of
research into drug advancements, furthering the patent system's goal
of promoting innovation.
The relaxed nonobviousness standard in the pharmaceutical field
may also be due to the high failure rate and the high costs of drug
development. In determining whether an invention is obvious, courts
look at secondary considerations, such as "commercial success, long
felt but unmet needs, [and] failure of others," that can shed light on
whether the PHOSITA would consider the invention obvious.2 4 These
factors weigh in favor of patentability despite the existence of prior
art that suggests development of the technology would be logical. 25 In

21.
E.g., Su, supra note 6, at 326. The National Institute of Food and
Agriculture defines "biotechnology" generally as "the use of biology or biological
processes to develop helpful products and services." Biotechnology & Genomics, U.S.
DEPT. OF AGRIC. NAT'L INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC.,

http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/

biotech/biotech all.html (last updated Mar. 18, 2009).
22.
For example, a 2010 study indicated that the cost of bringing a drug to
market is in the range of $1 billion. Ian Evans, Follow-On Biologics: A New Play for Big
Pharma, 83 YALE J. Bio. & MED. 97, 98 (2010). This number has been increasing from
the $54 million cost in 1976. OLIVER GASSMANN, GERRIT REEPMEYER & MAXIMILIAN
VON ZEDTWITZ, LEADING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: TRENDS AND DRIVERS FOR
GROWTH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2 (2d ed. 2008).

23.
See Su, supra note 6, at 332 ("Because of the high costs of biotechnology
and pharmaceutical research, a research proposal is unlikely to receive grants or any
sort of financial support without the projection of a 'reasonable expectation of
success."').

24.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
25.
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure defines prior art as any
patent-defeating reference. See MPEP § 2121 (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008) (describing

2012]

LESSONS FROM GENERICS

the pharmaceutical industry, the amount of time, resources, and
funding necessary to move a pharmaceutical technology through the
pipeline will often lead to an inference of nonobviousness.2 6 Thus, the
U.S. patent system's consideration of market forces and research
effort will naturally favor a finding of nonobviousness in the
pharmaceutical context.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to endorse any brightline rules for nonobviousness and has paved the way for an industryspecific approach. 27 For example, in KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex
Inc., 28 the Court rejected a strict application of a bright-line rule
because "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to
common sense ... are neither necessary under our case law nor
consistent with it." 29 Following KSR, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has instructed that "[e]ach case must be decided in its
particular context, including the characteristics of the science or
30
technology.
Although some scholars argue that the U.S. nonobviousness
standard is changing, it is unlikely that the Federal Circuit's 2009

how to determine whether a reference constitutes prior art). The statutory definition of
prior art is laid out in 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
In the United States, a pharmaceutical invention tends to satisfy the
nonobviousness requirement even when prior art suggests that the invention is logical
to try. Even if the combination of prior art references is logical, research in this field is
high risk and involves a large degree of trial and error. See Su, supra note 6, at 328.
Thus, there are still high research costs and uncertainty despite the existence of the
foundational technology. Id. A 2010 study indicated that the cost of bringing a drug to
market is in the range of $1 billion. Evans, supra note 22. Additionally, recent forays
into follow-on biologic technologies indicate that these derivative technologies, while
costing only $400 million-$500 million to develop, can spend as long as ten years in the
pipeline. Id. at 99.
26.
In the foundational article that proposed the use of secondary
considerations in determining obviousness, long-unresolved need was evidenced by a
significant quantity and quality of research devoted to the solution of similar problems
in the field. Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A Technical
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1173-74 (1964). Additionally, a
large capital investment would lead to the inference that a solution was not obvious.
Id. at 1174. The article further suggested that an inference of long-felt demand may be
established if "the time the defect persisted [was] at least ... longer than the average
time lapse proceeding the unpatented solutions of defects in the relevant art," and that
the significance of this time period will vary from industry to industry. Id. Taken
together, the amount of time, resources, and funding required in pharmaceutical
research should often lead to a finding of nonobviousness.
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421-22 (2007) and In re
27.
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006) for an illustration of the Court's rejection of
the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the "teaching-suggestion-motivation" test in
favor of a more flexible approach.
28.
KSR, 550 U.S. 398.
Id. at 421-22.
29.
Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1352 (2008).
30.
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decision in In re Kubin 3 ' will result in a heightened standard of
obviousness throughout the pharmaceutical sector.3 2 In In re Kubin,
the Federal Circuit upheld a Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI) decision, finding the claim for a protein binding
site to be obvious. 3 3 However, the case will likely not have a farreaching impact outside of the narrow field of gene sequencing. The
appellants failed to argue, and the court failed to consider, the
difficulty of locating the range of DNA sequences encrypting the
binding site.3 4 Instead, the court held that the binding-site sequence
was an inherent part of the full protein sequence. 35 The BPAI
considered the conventional techniques practiced in the field of
biotechnology in determining obviousness, but failed to properly
analyze the obviousness of the claimed invention-the specific
binding site.3 6 Therefore, the In re Kubin decision arguably does not
diverge from the Federal Circuit's practice of applying an industryspecific approach to obviousness.
In sum, pharmaceutical inventions in the United States must
only pass a low hurdle for nonobviousness to be patentable. Courts in
the United States will apply an industry-specific approach and
determine that a pharmaceutical invention is nonobvious even if it is
obvious to try.3 7 The lax standard for nonobviousness is intended to

incentivize innovation by increasing protection and minimizing risk
to pharmaceutical companies. However, in reality, the standard
enables pharmaceutical companies to merely patent trivial
adaptations of existing drugs, distracting companies from focusing on
the development of new products and the continued push of drugs
through the pipeline.

31.
In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
32.
See id. at 1360 ("This court cannot.., cling to formalistic rules for
obviousness, customize its legal tests for specific scientific fields in ways that deem
entire classes of prior art teachings irrelevant, or discount the significant abilities of
artisans of ordinary skill in an advanced area of art.").
33.
Id. at 1352.
34.
Significantly, the court failed to distinguish between decoding a particular
useful sequence and the routine practice of decoding the entire protein sequence. Id. at
1356 (finding that the appellants merely used conventional methods to determine the
entire nucleotide sequence of the protein without discussion of how that partial
sequence was distinguished from the rest of the DNA code).
35.
Id. at 1358.
36.
Indeed, in Richard Robbins's foundational article that led to the Supreme
Court's adoption of secondary considerations as tools for determining obviousness,
Robbins acknowledged that a "proper assessment of the magnitude of the [problem
sought

to be resolved] ...

will be hampered

if the necessary

evidence is ...

too

technical." Robbins, supra note 26 at 1173. Here, the BPAI appeared to struggle with
grasping the definition of the technology itself and consequently applied the prior art
too broadly in making its obviousness determination. See In re Kubin, 561 F.3d at
1360-61.
37.
See supra note 25 for a discussion of obvious-to-try jurisprudence.
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B. In India
India has a relatively high standard for nonobviousness and
8
applies the standard strictly toward pharmaceutical inventions. 3
India's emphasis on a significant innovative step indicates the
country's reluctance to monopolize drug therapies. 39 Instead, the
country's pharmaceutical market is built around the generics
industry.40 Although India's patent system prevents the extended
monopoly of pharmaceutical products through evergreening, which
benefits its consumers, its strict patentability requirements would be
overly burdensome on a pharmaceutical industry focused on high-risk
development of breakthrough drugs.
Prior to the TRIPS agreement, India did not provide patent
protection for pharmaceutical products. 41 Instead, India only
protected the drug manufacturing process, and only for up to a sevenyear term. 42 India's first independent Patents Act sought to create a
domestic pharmaceutical market and decrease the cost of
medication. 43 Thus, the Patents Act turned away many foreign
pharmaceutical companies and resulted in a larger market share for
domestically owned companies. 44 India flourished at reverseengineering drugs and selling them both domestically and in other
developing countries that did not honor patent protection for
pharmaceutical products. 45 However, once TRIPS became fully
effective in India in 2005,46 the country was obligated to honor patent
47
protection of pharmaceutical compositions.

38.
See The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 2(a)(1)ja), INDIA
CODE, vol. 18 (requiring either an advance in technology or some economic
significance).
39.
See discussion infra Part IV.B (recounting India's hesitation toward
protecting pharmaceutical innovation throughout the course of the history of the
country's patent system).
40.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
41.
See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous
Transformation of India's Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical
Innovation, 68 U. Pirr. L. REV. 491, 495 (2007) (describing the historical evolution of
pharmaceutical patents in India).
42.
Id. at 514.
43.
See id. ("The eventual economic effect of the India Patents Act, 1970, was a
dramatic increase in domestic generic drug manufacturing and a sharp decline in the
price of medicines sold in India.").
44.
Id. at 515.
45.
Id. at 514-15.
46.
Id. at 518-19 (discussing the "TRIPS-catalyzed transformation of India's
patent laws").
47.
India amended its patent statute to allow for the protection of a
pharmaceutical substance. See The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 17 of 1999, INDIA
CODE, vol. 22 (enabling protection of an invention for a substance itself intended for use
as medicine or drug).
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India's Patents Act requires that, to satisfy the nonobvious

standard, an invention be nonobvious and either involve the advance
of technology or be economically significant. 48 However, the Patents
Act does not specify the standard that should be used to determine
whether technology is advanced or whether the invention is
economically significant. 49 While scholars have criticized the
definition as "vague and arbitrary,"5 0 it appears that India has
successfully implemented a high standard of nonobviousness that will
enable judicial flexibility in protecting competition and driving down
market costs. 5 1
When India amended its patent law to comply with the TRIPS
agreement, it also added a controversial provision intended to curtail
evergreening of pharmaceutical patents. 52 The provision, § 3(d), bars
companies from patenting new forms of known substances unless the
new form demonstrates a significant enhancement in efficacy.5 3 In

January 2006, the Patent Controller in Chennai used § 3(d) in
refusing to grant pharmaceutical manufacturer Novartis a patent on
its beta crystalline salt form of an existing anti-cancer drug. 54
Novartis argued that the more stable salt form could be absorbed
more easily into the bloodstream, resulting in an increase in
bioavailability of up to 30 percent. 55 The Assistant Controller saw the
difference as "only" 30 percent and ruled that the free base form could

48.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 2(a)(1)(ja), INDIA CODE,
vol. 18. This definition departs from the prior Indian case law, which equated
"inventive step" with "nonobviousness." See Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Indus., (1978)
254 S.C.R. 757, 777 (India), available at http:(www.indiankanoon.orgdocl1905157.
49.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 2(a)(1)(ja).
50.
Mueller, supra note 41, at 564 (quoting Manoj Pillai, India: India's Patents
Bill,
2005-Is
It
TRIPS
Compliant?,
MONDAQ,
(Mar.
31,
2005),
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=31717).
51.
See Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of
TRIPS Implementation in India's Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1593
(2009) (describing how India's subject-matter exclusions create a narrower standard for
patentability and allow for a larger scope of competition in the marketplace).
52.
See, e.g., Novartis AG v. Union of India and Others, SLP (Civil) Nos.
20539-20549 of 2009, LAWYERS COLLECTIVE, http://www.lawyerscollective.org/accessto-medicine/atm-current-cases.html#more-174 (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) [hereinafter
Novartis AG] (describing § 3(d) of the Patents Act as one of the safeguards against
evergreening).
53.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 3(d). The statute also lists
several examples of substances that will be considered the same as a known substance:
salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure forms, particle size, isomers,
mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations, and other derivatives. Id.
54.
Novartis AG, supra note 52.
55.
See Shamnad Basheer & T. Prashant Reddy, The "Efficacy" of Indian
Patent Law: Ironing Out the Creases in Section 3(d), 5 SCRIPTED 232, 239-40 (2008)
(detailing the court's rejection of Novartis's argument that its drug's pharmaceutical
composition constituted "increased efficacy").
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be used wherever the salt was used. 56 Novartis has challenged the
ruling, arguing that § 3(d) of the 2005 Patents Act does not comply
with TRIPS. 57 The Supreme Court of India's decision, due later this
year, will determine the country's position on the patenting of new
forms of already known drugs. Until then, it remains unclear what
constitutes a significant enhancement in efficacy.
India's approach to obviousness can provide guidance for the
United States as it attempts to address the decreasing production in
its pharmaceutical sector. Although a large degree of judicial
discretion would probably not work well in the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry, where the high-risk nature of the industry gives companies
reason to shy away from projects that may not win patent protection,
a heightened standard that leaves some room for judicial discretion
could be used to push the pharmaceutical sector back toward higherrisk research investments.
C. In Israel
Like India, Israel endorses a demanding nonobviousness
requirement for patentability. 58 Israel's use of nonanalogous art as
references for obviousness rejections stretches the bounds of what is
considered obvious. 59 Consequently, pharmaceutical companies run
the risk of developing a drug therapy that is genuinely innovative,
but that still is denied patent protection by the court system. The
uncertainty in Israel's nonobviousness standard would not support
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry.
Israel's strict nonobviousness requirement is based in the
country's status as a dominant producer of generics. Israel is home to
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, the world's largest generics
company, 60 and its pharmaceutical exports constitute 3 percent of the
country's gross domestic product. 6 1 Israel also has a strong domestic
pharmaceutical market. Israel pushed the development of the

56.
57.

Id. at 240.
Id. at 234.

58.
See DAVID MENCHER, ASS'N INT'LE POUR LA PROT. DE LA PROP.
INTELLECTUELLE [AIPPI], QUESTION Q217: THE PATENTABILITY CRITERION OF
INVENTIVE STEP/NON-OBVIOUSNESS
(2011), available at https://www.aippi.org/

downloadlcommitees/217/GR217israel.pdf (articulating Israel's requirement for a
significant contribution to the relevant art).
59.
See id. at 3 (discussing Israel's policy of looking even to fields that are
"remote from that of the invention").
60.
Teva-Top 10 Generic Drug Companies 2010, FIERCEPHARMA (Aug. 10,
2010, 8:06 AM), http://www.fiercepharma.comlspecial-reports/top- 10-generic-drugcompanies-2010/teva-top- 10-generic-drug-companies-2010.
61.
Israeli
Pharmaceutical Market
in
Numbers,
LN
PHARMA,
http:/flnpharma.com/Israeli-pharmaceutical-market/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
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generics pharmaceutical industry in order to provide healthcare to its
citizens at the cheapest possible cost.62 Accordingly, the domestic
industry is supported by "sick funds," which provide medical
insurance and hospital services for Israelis, 63 and constitute 70
64
percent of domestic pharmaceutical sales.
Section 5 of Israel's Patent Act indicates that, to be eligible for
patent protection, an inventor must achieve an inventive step that is
not obvious to the PHOSITA at the time of filing. 65 Additionally,
Appendix G of Israel's Patent Office Guidelines for Examination
indicates that an "inventive step" requires a "quantum" advancement
over the prior art.66 In 2011, the Israeli Supreme Court confirmed
that an "inventive step" requires a significant contribution to the
relevant art and possesses the "spark of invention." 67 Therefore, like
India, Israel requires an inventor to overcome a greater threshold
than mere likelihood of success and mandates that a patentable
invention contribute to the progress of science by providing a
significant advancement to the technical field.
One unique aspect of Israeli patent law is the broad selection of
relevant prior art for determining obviousness. Unlike in the United
States, where prior art sources are limited to analogous prior art, 68
Israeli law only prefers prior art from related fields. Israeli case law
allows a combination of "all relevant knowledge ...which could be
applied to the invention as claimed even from fields remote from that
of the invention. '69 Therefore, an inventor seeking patent protection
must demonstrate a significant advancement that would not have
been suggested by the combination of prior art even from remotely
related fields. Thus, Israel's nonobviousness standard is extremely
difficult for an inventor to overcome.
While Israel does have a heightened nonobviousness standard,
the country's patent office does not place a large burden of proof on

62.
Id.
63.
See ProtectingPatents, WORLDPHARMA, http://www.worldpharmaceuticals.net/
articles/wpfO6_098.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) (explaining Israel's "main domestic
market" for pharmaceutical sales is its sick funds).
64.
Id.
65.
Patents Law, 5727-1967, 21 LSI 149, § 5 (1967) (Isr.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8199.
66.
ISRAEL PATENT OFFICE GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION, app. G
1 (Isr.),
available at http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJHeb/RashamHaptentimlPtentim/Bhina/,
interpreted by MENCHER, supra note 58, at 1.
67.
See generally MENCHER, supra note 58, for a summary of the Israeli
Supreme Court's landmark decisions.
68.
MPEP § 2141.01(a) (8th ed. Rev. 6, Sept. 2007). However, a reference in a
different field of art may be considered analogous if, "because of the matter with which
it deals, [it] logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention." Id.
69.
MENCHER, supra note 58, at 3 (quoting Israeli Supreme Court case
Akerstein v. Alumim).
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the applicant to demonstrate significant improvement over the art. In
a recent dispute, the Israeli Patent Office determined that, as long as
the applicant made a convincing argument that the inventive step
requirement had been satisfied, the burden is on the challenger to
show lack of inventive step. 70 If an invention is sufficiently enabled
and demonstrates some inventive step and utility, there is no
requirement that the applicant provide extensive documentation
71
backing the inventive step.
Although Israel's heightened obviousness standard has the
potential to encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in pioneer
products rather than be content with follow-on patents, it is likely
insufficient to singlehandedly foster such innovation. Israel's practice
of incorporating nonanologous art, if adopted by the United States,
would push U.S. pharmaceutical companies to seek only follow-on
patents because the risk of developing sufficiently innovative new
drugs would be economically infeasible to shoulder. Israel's
obviousness standard is too biased toward the generics market and
would not support the continued development of blockbuster drugs in
the United States.

III. THE CHOICE TO ADOPT LINKAGE REGULATION AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE GENERICS INDUSTRY

A pharmaceutical manufacturer that obtains a monopoly on a
drug passes the high costs of research and commercialization on to
the consumer. 72 Consumers that are unwilling or incapable of paying
for brand-name medication must wait until the patent expires before
generics are introduced to the market. 73 Thus, countries must
balance incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation with bringing

70.
See Michael Factor, Is a PatentApplicant Obliged To Make Clinical Trials
Available To Prove the Efficacy and Non-Obviousness of an Invention?, THE IP FACTOR
(May 30, 2012, 10:23 PM), http:/fblog.ipfactor.co.i12012/05/30/is-a-patent-applicantobliged-to-make-clinical-trials-avaiable-to-prove-the-efficiacy-and-non-obviousness-ofan-invention] (explaining the "onus" is on the opposer if the "application is sufficiently
enabled and convincing to show inventive step and utility").
71.
See id. ("[T]he applicant is only responsible to make publications available
to examiners during prosecution, not clinical trials, if the application is sufficiently
enabled and convincing to show inventive step and utility' . ... ").
72.
See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supranote 1, at 244 (discussing how manufacturers
will pass the cost of research and development on to consumers in the form of increased
prices).
73.
Manufacturers that have complete control over pricing can price a drug so
that only the wealthy can afford it. See id. at 243 (describing how manufacturers can
create pricing tiers).
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cheaper generics options to the market. 74 The United States was the
first country to adopt a patent linkage regime intended both to
reward pioneer pharmaceutical companies and to facilitate the entry
of generics into the marketplace. 75 Many countries have since
followed suit, intending to better negotiate terms of trade agreements
76
known as "TRIPS-Plus" provisions.
Patent linkage is defined as "the practice of linking the granting
of... any regulatory approval for a generic medicinal product to the
status of a patent for the originator reference product. '77 Under this
practice, intellectual property rights are linked to regulatory rights,
which include the rights to exclusivity periods attached to drugapproval data. 78 Generics manufacturers cannot receive regulatory
approval or marketing authorization for a developing medicinal
product that is still protected by a patent. 79 Thus, the benefit of the
patent linkage regime is that it enables research and development
into the generics market. However, by linking development to the
status of the pioneer patent, the regime also restricts the ability of
generics manufacturers and often results in potentially long and
costly litigation before market approval is granted.8 0
The power of linkage regimes expands when the marketing of a
drug can be "linked" to multiple patents. 81 Linkage regimes enable a
pioneer company to register a list of any patents that might be
82
relevant to the marketing of a particular pharmaceutical compound.
For a generics manufacturer to overcome claims of infringement
when seeking regulatory approval, the manufacturer must

74.
By reducing drug prices, treatment can be made available to a larger
population. However, there is still a need to reduce risk in drug development in order
to encourage manufacturers to advance the field so that new treatments can continue
to be developed. See supra note 26 for a discussion of the risks involved in development
of a new drug.
75.
Bouchard et al., supra note 13, at 396-97.
76.
Id.
77.
Mabel Tsui, Access to Medicine and the Dangers of PatentLinkage: Lessons
from Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, 18(3) J. LAw & MED. 577, 582 (2011) (quoting
EUROPEAN COMM'N, EUROPEAN COMMISSION PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY: FINAL

REPORT pt. 1, at 130 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/
pharmaceuticals/inquirystaff.working-paper-partl.pdf.
78.
Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas de Deux of PharmaceuticalRegulation and
Innovation: Who's Leading Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1475 (2009).
79.
EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra, note 77, at 130.
80.
See Bouchard et al., supra note 13, at 392, 394-95 ("Linkage regulations tie
generic drug availability to existing drug patents by connecting approval to the
resolution of patent validity or infringement. This can result in long and costly
litigation, the costs of which are ultimately borne by consumers.").
81.
See Bouchard et al., supra note 78, at 395-96 (discussing the linkage
regime and generic drugs).
82.
Id. at 394-95.
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demonstrate that each patent listed in the register is invalid.8 3 Thus,
a company's ability to list many patents on a register imposes a
significant burden on the generics manufacturer. This results in the
delayed release of generics into the market as the manufacturers wait
for the patents to expire before initiating the regulatory approval
process.

A. In the United States
The United States attempts to strike a balance between
consumer and industry through the implementation of a patent
linkage regime. However, the regime's patent-term-extension
mechanism frustrates the pharmaceutical market's problem with
evergreening because patent holders can further extend their
monopolies based on trivial distinctions between drugs.
When the United States passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, it
became the first country to adopt a linkage regime.8 4 The HatchWaxman Act balances the twin goals of strengthened patent
protection and facilitated generics market entry. The Act achieves
both these goals by providing a facilitated method of patent
enforcement complemented by a mechanism for generics to enter the
85
market with reduced regulatory costs.
The initial implementation of the Hatch-Waxman Act led to
increased policing of pharmaceutical patents because patent owners
were no longer solely responsible for detecting infringing activity. To
obtain marketing approval, generics hopefuls now had to disclose
existing patents related to the proposed generic and explain why the
applicant's activity did not infringe these patents. 86 This initial
cooperation between the regulatory body and patent owners in
policing patents benefited the pioneer pharmaceutical companies
while indirectly passing the cost to the consumer through litigation

Id.
83.
See id. at 1477 (describing how Canada modeled its linkage regime after
84.
the Hatch-Waxman Act, which was the only existing linkage regime at the time).
85.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, tit. 1 (1984). An incentive to enter the market is important.
The typical research and development process takes up to seventeen years and involves
four general stages: one to two years of preliminary research for identifying the target
and synthesizing the active substance; two to four years for early-stage screening and
preclinical trials; six to seven years for clinical trials; and two to four years for
registration with the relevant health authorities and product launch. GASSMANN,
REEPMEYER & VON ZEDTWITZ, supra note 22, at 62-65.
See W. Edward Bailey, A. Joy Arnold & Thomas D. Lyford, Recent Hatch86.
Waxman Reform: Balancing Innovation, Competition, and Affordability, BUILDING IP
VALUE, http:/www.buildingipvalue.com/05-NA/1O7_110.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2012)
(describing the certifications that generic manufacturers must now make in order to
seek approval).
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and, as a result, increased the cost of generics. The Hatch-Waxman
Act's goal of bringing generics to market, however, was not initially
realized.
Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act have provided increased
protection for generics manufacturers. In the Bolar provision,
Congress stated that generics manufacturers may engage in
otherwise infringing activity that is necessary for regulatory
approval. 87 The broader safe harbor provision allows generics
manufacturers to practice the protected patent in an ordinarily
infringing manner if it is for purposes of investigating new
treatments and the research could reasonably lead to a regulatory
submission. 88 Consequently, the safe harbor is not limited to followon and generics applications. 89 The Bolar and safe harbor provisions
are intended to encourage research and development of both new and
generic drugs. 90 Without these provisions, the monopoly on a brandname drug would effectively be extended because the holder of an
expired patent would be granted an additional two- to three-year lead
time before any generics became ready for market. 9 1
Even with these provisions, however, the protective mechanisms
available to safeguard the generics industry appear to be secondary to
protective mechanisms for patent holders. The safe harbor and Bolar
provisions were added by Congress only in response to case law where
generics manufacturers were found to be infringing patents simply by
preparing for the release of the generic product upon the expiration of
the patent. 92 Additionally, preliminary interpretations of the HatchWaxman Act by the Federal Circuit interpreted the scope of the Act
broadly, favoring an interpretation that benefits exiting patent
holders. Another aspect of the Hatch-Waxman Act that favors patent
holders is a provision that provides for a form of patent-term
extension for pioneer drugs known as patent-term restoration, which
allows a pharmaceutical company to extend the term of its patent for

87.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006) ("[I]t shall not be an act of infringement to
make, use, or sell a patented invention ...solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs .... ").
88.
Bouchard et al., supra note 13, at 415.
89.
Id. at 414.
90.
Id. at 411-12.
91.
Id. at 415.
See Christopher Garrison, Exceptions to PatentRights in Developing Countries,
92.
UNCTAD-ICTSD, 14 (Aug. 2006), httpJ/www.unctad.orglen/docs/iteipc2006l2_en.pdf
(discussing how Congress created the Bolar provision after Roche successfully sued
Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co. for carrying out testing necessary to prepare its regulatory
dossier).
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up to five years to compensate for lost time during the investigational
new drug period and the new drug application review period.9 3
Thus, despite the Act's goal of encouraging early investigation
into new generic products, studies have indicated that the
introduction of generics to the market has slowed, resulting in an
increased cost to the consumer. 94 Furthermore, pharmaceutical
companies have increasingly participated in a race to file follow-on
patents rather than spending time and money investigating pioneer
drugs. 95 As a result, innovation suffers and extended monopolies are
weighted over public health concerns.
Again, it appears that U.S. policy makers have missed the mark
in their attempt to encourage development of pioneer drugs. The
relatively easy availability of follow-on patents has encouraged
pharmaceutical companies to focus on protecting existing drugs
rather than investing in the development of new drugs. 96 Likewise,
the patent-term-extension option, while certainly an aid in mitigating
risk, only compounds the protection of incremental steps in technical
advancement and does not effectively encourage development of new
drugs. The longer the patent-term-extension period, the greater the
incentive to only innovate when the obviousness standard and patentterm extension are adjusted in tandem.
B. In India
India has battled the establishment of a patent linkage regime,
which it believes would hamper its generics industry. 97 The country's
High Court recently ruled against Bayer in a patent-infringement
suit, finding that India's Drugs and Cosmetics Act could not be read

35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006).
93.
94.
Ron A. Bouchard, I'm Still Your Baby: Canada's Continuing Support of
U.S. Linkage Regulationsfor Pharmaceuticals,15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 71, 114
(2011); Bouchard et al., supra note 13, at 398-99.
95.
Bouchard, supra note 94; Bouchard et al., supra note 13; Joseph A. DiMasi
& Laura B. Faden, Competitiveness in Follow-On Drug R&D: A Race or Imitation?, 10
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 23 (2011).

See sources cited supranote 95.
96.
97.
There is a history of Indian case-law jurisprudence recognizing a humanrights policy for promoting the generics industry. Tsui, supra note 77, at 587. The High
Court has indicated that "protection of one's life ... [is] an obligation cast on the State
to provide" and that "[tihe obligation includes improvement of public health as its
primary duty." Id. at 586 (quoting Punjab v. Bagga, (1998) 4 S.C.C. 117 (India)). The
court has also indicated that health includes "medical care and health facilities." Id. at
586 (citing ESC Ltd. v. Bose, (1992) 1 S.C.C. 441 (India)). Furthermore, the court has
indicated that maximum resources should be devoted to preserving human life. Id. at
587 (citing Mazdoorsamity v. West Bengal, (1996) 4 S.C.C. 37 (India)).

1266

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45:1249

98
together with its Patents Act to establish a de facto linkage regime.
Bayer argued that in reading the statutes together, the Indian
government was also bound by the patent laws to respect Bayer's
patent rights. 99 Under this theory, the government-affiliated Drug
Controller General of India could not grant marketing approval to a
generics manufacturer while the patent was still in force.1 00 This
reading would effectively impose an additional condition on the Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, "linking" the marketing approval to the use of the
patented claimed invention. 101 However, the court held that
marketing approval in and of itself does not constitute patent
infringement, and that it would be nonsensical to allow development
of research performed in preparation for approval but not the
approval itself. 10 2 The court determined that patent linkage is only a
TRIPS-Plus construction that is not applicable to India, which is only
bound to the parameters of TRIPS itself.'0 3 The court acknowledged
the growing opinion in developed countries cautioning against the use
of linkage. 10 4 Although India's opposition to patent linkage regimes
may be optimal for a country focused on the development of its
generics industry, such opposition would only
discourage
pharmaceutical companies from investing in high-risk ventures to
develop pioneer patents. Without the benefit of patent-term extension
and a regulatory body to police generics manufacturers, such research
and development would be too risky.

C. In Israel
Israel, like the United States, is part of the global linkage-regime
network. In 1998, Israel passed the Teva Act, which largely mirrors

98.
See generally Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, (2009) WP(C) No. 7833/2008
(Delhi H.C.) (India), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SRB/judgement/18-08-2009/
SRB18082009MATC78332008.pdf.
99.
See Tsui, supra note 77, at 580 (outlining Bayer's argument for a collective
reading of the Patents Act and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act).
100.
See id. ("The effect of a collective reading meant that the patent 'has the
same effect on the Government as on others."').
101.
See id. (describing how the reading together of the two provisions would
result in a de facto linkage regime).
102.
Id.
103.
See Bouchard et al., supra note 13, at 418 ("The court based its decision in
part based on the finding that patent linkage is a 'TRIPS-Plus' concept and that India
had only signed on to TRIPS.").
104.
See id. ("Earlier in the decision, Judge Muralindhar noted that there was a
growing opinion in developed countries, including the European Union, that cautioned
against linkage.").
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the Hatch-Waxman Act. 105 The Teva Act enables generics
pharmaceutical companies to perform research and development
activities in furtherance of bringing generics to market while the
controlling pioneer patent is still in force.10 6 Additionally, the Teva
Act includes a patent-term-restoration provision, enabling extensions
of up to five years on the pioneer patent. 10 7 In effect, the legislation
strikes a bargain between generics and brand-name drug makers,
allowing generics manufacturers to perform research while extending
the pioneer patent owner's monopoly.108
Despite Israel's implementation of a patent linkage regime, its
patent-term restoration is inadequate. 0 9s Under Israel's Patents Act
and the Pharmacist Ordinance, patent-term-extension periods are
linked to the earliest date of product approval in any country
recognized by the legislation. 110 Consequently, the patent-extension
terms are, in effect, considerably shorter than the five years stated in
the statute."1 As a result, U.S. pharmaceutical companies are unable
to obtain meaningful protection in Israel. 112 Israel's restricted use of
patent-term extension gives Israel an unfair advantage when
113
exporting its generics into the U.S. market.
Although Israel utilizes a patent linkage regime, it is purposed
for the advancement of the generics industry and not the protection of
brand-name pharmaceutical companies. Because Israel's patent
linkage regime provides inadequate patent-term restoration, it does
not significantly promote the advancement of pioneer drugs.

105.
Gene Kleinhendler & Renana Dolev-Harel, IP Law Challenges in Israel:
New Strategies for Emerging Technologies, ASPATORE, July 2009, available at 2009 WL
2029094, at *3.
106. Id.
107.
Yafit Avital, Israel: Patent Term Extension Matters in Israel,MONDAQ (Aug.
30, 2004), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=28037; Kleinhendler & DolevHarel, supra note 105.
108.
See Kfir Luzzatto, Pharmaceutical Patent Term Extension in Israel,
LUzzATTo & LuzzATTo 1 http://www.luzzatto.comlarticles/11.12.08(12).pdf (last visited
Oct. 1, 2012) (discussing how the patent-term extension is a quid pro quo for generics
research).
109.
See Malini Aisola, PhRMA Pushes for Data Exclusivity in 2010 Special 301
Comments, KEI (Mar. 1, 2010, 6:11 PM), http:/keionline.org/node/789 (describing the
limitations of Israel's extended exclusivity terms).
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. (explaining how Israel's practices provide local generic companies with
an unfair commercial advantage when exporting their generic products to the major
markets in the United States and Europe).
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IV. THE IMPACT OF PATENT POLICY ON THE GENERICS INDUSTRY

The differences in the patent policies of the United States, India,
and Israel have a profound effect on the entrance of generics into
each national market. While the United States' relatively relaxed

nonobviousness requirement and its patent-term extension lead to a
pro-industry outcome, India and Israel have developed more
consumer-friendly industries by restricting a patent applicant's
ability to protect developments that do not reach breakthrough
status. The policy decisions made by these countries are gradually
sculpting the landscape of the international pharmaceutical industry.
A. In the United States
In the United States, the lenient approach toward patentability
and the introduction of the linkage regime have stifled entry of
generics into the market and have led to the development of the
world's most powerful brand pharmaceutical industry. 114 By lowering
the bar for nonobviousness, whether through the application of
secondary considerations or through a direct, policy-driven exception
for the pharmaceutical sector, the United States has become a unique
source of follow-on patents. 115 The strategy for filing follow-on
patents, also known as evergreening, results in an effectively
perpetual extension of a monopoly on the pioneer patent.
Follow-on patents are strategically used to stunt competition;
such patents often are filed in anticipation of the release of generics
into the market. 116 The trend proves that brand-name
pharmaceutical companies can abuse the system by lengthening their
monopolies and prolonging dominance in the market. 117 The
pharmaceutical-specific, flexible approach to determining obviousness
is intended to encourage research and innovation, but there is a risk
that the standard is actually self-defeating. 118 The practice of
evergreening turns innovation into a race to secure even the most
minor patents, even if a generics manufacturer is merely reserving a

See, e.g., SCHWEITZER, supra note 4 (labeling the United States as a world
114.
leader in the pharmaceutical industry).
See generally THOMAS, supra note 13 (describing the tendency for U.S.
115.
pharmaceutical companies to pursue follow-on patents).
116.
See id. (describing how brand-name companies will often patent an overthe-counter formulation that can be brought to market before a generic formulation,
thereby establishing brand recognition without pressure from competitors).
See id. at 1 (noting that a common critique of evergreening is the extension
117.
of market exclusivity).
118.
See discussion supra Part I.A (discussing the effect of the nonobviousness
standard on pharmaceutical innovation).

2012]

LESSONS FROM GENERICS

1269

place in line and not planning on using its own invention until an
original blockbuster patent expires.
Scholarship has indicated that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry
is suffering from "a lack of genuine innovation." 119 Patent
overprotection has led brand-name companies to focus on
maintaining patent protection of existing drugs rather than investing
in new therapies.12 0 However, this approach only works in the short
term; long term stability and growth of the U.S. pharmaceutical
121
industry requires the regular deployment of blockbuster drugs.
Despite the need for new, innovative drugs in the United States,
there was a 3.8 percent decrease in blockbuster sales from 2000 to
2008. 122 Although the development of screening technologies has
improved, only three out of every ten drugs that are brought to
market actually generate enough revenue to meet or exceed the
average cost of research and development.123 Because the average
gestational period for a drug is approximately thirteen years, 1 24 there
is a narrow window of about eight years before the patent expires to
recoup the cost of innovation. 25 Therefore, the structure of the U.S.
patent law system is not currently optimized for inducing innovation.
The pharmaceutical sector suffers from both too much and not
enough protection, squelching incentive to seek out the truly
blockbuster ideas necessary to keep the industry afloat.
B. In India
India has aggressively built its generics pharmaceutical
market. 126 After barring the patentability of pharmaceutical products
completely during the first thirty-five years of its patent system's
existence, 12 7 India finally allowed these products to be patented when
TRIPS came into full effect in 2005.128 Since then, India has applied a

119.
GASSMANN, REEPMEYER & VON ZEDTWITZ, supra note 22, at 51.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 52.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. at 56.
124.
See supra note 85 for a discussion of the time frame for drug development.
125.
Once launched, the drug will only be protected for the remaining duration
of the twenty-year patent term. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (defining the patent term).
Assuming that the manufacturer files for the patent early in the research and
development process, this will allow approximately eight years of exclusive sales.
126.
See supra Parts II.B and III.B for a discussion of the evolution of India's
patent system.
127.
Mueller, supra note 41, at 512.
128.
Id. at 518-19.
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strict standard for obviousness determinations 129 while firmly
130
rejecting a patent linkage regime.
The implementation of TRIPS and the availability of compulsory
licenses following therefrom further bolstered India's generics market
and continued India's battle against brand-name manufacturers. 131 A
March 2012 decision by the Controller General of Patents Designs
and Trademarks (CGPDTM) marked the first time that a compulsory
license was granted in India.1 32 Citing a provision of the Indian
Patents Act that allows for compulsory licensing three years after the
grant of a patent on a drug that is not available at affordable prices in
India, the CGPDTM required Bayer to license one of its cancer drugs
to an Indian company. 133 The CGPDTM found that only about 200
bottles of the tablets had been imported into the country since its
2006 release and that an estimated 23,000 citizens required the drug
for life-saving treatment. 134 While Bayer had priced the drug at
280,000 rupees ($5,600) for a month-long treatment, the terms of the
compulsory license allowed the Indian company to sell the drug for
8,880 rupees ($176) for the same treatment, supplying Bayer with a 6
percent royalty rate on net sales. 135 The decision is likely to create
concern for brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers who rely on
patent protection to recoup development costs.
C. In Israel
Like India, Israel is home to several large-scale generics
manufacturers. 136 Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, in addition to

129.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, § 2(a)(1)(ja), INDIA CODE,
vol. 18.
130.
See supra Part III.B for a discussion of India's High Court decision in Bayer
Corp. v. Union of India.
See Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Bayer Corp., (2012) C.I.A. No. 1 of 2011 55 (India),
131.
availableat http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipoNew/compulsory_-License_12032012.pdf (granting a
compulsory license to a generics manufacturer to market and produce Nexavar).
132.
Id.; Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India Orders Bayer to License a
Patented Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2012, at B2.
133.
Natco Pharma Ltd., C.I.A. No. 1 of 2011 at 60. A compulsory license
establishes an involuntary contract between an unwilling seller and a willing buyer.
The contract is imposed and enforced by the governing body. Under the current Indian
Patents Act, such a license can only be imposed after the drug has been patented for
three years. The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, § 84(1), INDIA CODE.
134.
Natco PharmaLtd., C.I.A. No. 1 of 2011 at 13-14.
Id. at 15, 60-61; Bajaj & Pollack, supra note 132 ("Legal specialists and
135.
patient advocates said it could open the door to a flood of other compulsory licenses in
India and possibly in other developing countries, creating a new supply of cheap
generic drugs.").
136.
Karen S. Ginsbury, Israel Generics Drug Manufacturers and the Market,
2003 BUSINESS BRIEFING: PHARMAGENERICS 61, 61 (discussing Israeli generic
manufacturers, including Teva, Taro, and Agis).
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being the world's largest generics manufacturer, 1 37 is also one of the
top twenty pharmaceutical companies overall 138 and recently merged
with both generics 139 and brand drug companies. 140 Israel's generics
pharmaceutical market reportedly was valued at $7 billion in 2010.141
Israel's exports to the United States constitute 75 percent of its total
142
pharmaceutical exports.
Israel's focus on dominating the worldwide generics market
14 3
A
requires a substantial commitment to research and development.
order
in
development
toward
resources
devote
must
company
generics
to compete on price and be the first to market. 144 By entering the
marketplace first, a company assures itself a large market share and
customer loyalty. 145 Brand companies, on the other hand, do not
participate in the same race to the market as generics, but instead
rely on monopolies and increased prices to recover their development
costs. Thus, although both brand and generics manufacturers invest
substantially in research and development, one has the goal of
developing blockbuster drugs while the other focuses on pushing latecomers out of the market. Brand companies rely on the patent system
while generics companies rely primarily on supply and demand.
The development of the large generics markets in countries like
India and Israel has begun to shift the worldwide pharmaceuticals
market in favor of generics. 146 Fewer blockbuster drugs are moving
through the pipeline. 147 And as the costs of research and development

137.

Id.

138.

Teva

Pharmaceutical

Industries-Jerusalem,

BIOJERUSALEM,

http://www.biojerusalem.org.il/database-company.asp?ID=76 (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
Natasha Singer, Teva To Acquire Top German Generics Maker for $5
139.
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at B2 (RatioPharm); Teva Completes $934m Taiyo
Acquisition, GLOBES (July 14, 2011, 9:40 AM), http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/
globes/docview.asp?did=1000664169&fid=1725 (Taiyo Pharmaceutical Industry Co.).
Chris V. Nicholson, Teva To Buy Cephalon for $6.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
140.
May 3, 2011, at B4 (Cephalon); Teva Buys Drug Rival, Barr, for $7.46 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2O08/O7/19business/19teva.html (Barr
Pharmaceuticals).
IsraeliPharmaceuticalMarket in Numbers, supra note 61.
141.
142. Id.
See Ginsbury, supra note 136, at 64 (discussing how an emphasis on
143.
research and development (R&D) is necessary to be competitive on price and first to
market).
144.
See id. (stating that a company must be able to be the first to market and
provide competitive pricing to remain competitive in the generics industry).
See id. (discussing how being first to market "ensures a large initial share
145.
of the market that is subsequently relatively easy to maintain and has the possibility
to increase").
See, e.g., Hitesh Gajaria, India To Be Amongst Top Three Generic Makers in
146.
the World, EXPRESS PHARMA (Jan. 16-31, 2008), http://www.expresspharmaonline.com
20080131/indianpharmain2O2008.shtml (discussing how India's generics market is
expected to grow due to economic prosperity).
See id. (discussing the "increasing spread of generics").
147.
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increase while countries cut their healthcare budgets, many countries
feel even greater pressure to shift toward the use of generics. 148 As a
result of this worldwide trend toward generics, the U.S. brand
pharmaceutical industry, already the worldwide brand industry
149
leader, will only increase its dominance.

V. PROPOSED ALTERATIONS

TO THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM

The U.S. patent and regulatory system should be revamped with
a heightened nonobviousness standard and assurance that the
resulting meritorious patents receive extended protection through the
patent linkage regime. Public healthcare can only thrive by ensuring
both the continued development and availability of pharmaceutical
products,
which
requires
concurrent
reformation
of the
nonobviousness patentability standard and the Hatch-Waxman
regulatory mechanism.
The patent system promotes technical innovation by balancing
two competing interests: the inventor's interest in a monopoly and the
public's interest in disclosure and the right to practice. If the system
is functioning properly, the inventor receives just enough of a
monopoly to be motivated to disclose his invention. The monopoly
should also encourage the inventor to pursue the invention in the
first place by investing substantial time and money in research. This
second motivation, which primarily drives the patent system to
"promote the progress of science and useful arts," 150 can vary
dramatically from one technical field to the next. 15 1 The more one
must invest in research, the greater the risk and the greater the
152
necessary reward.
The U.S. patent system has recognized the disparity in
motivational factors across the sciences by allowing flexibility in its

148.
See id. (describing how the pharmaceutical industry is facing pressure due
to "declining R&D productivity on the back of steeply rising drug discovery and
development costs, as well as increasing sales and marketing expenses").
149.
In 2010, the worldwide generics market was valued at $124 billion. India
To Dominate World Generic Market, INDIAN EXPRESS (Dec. 1, 2010, 2:36 PM),
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-to-dominate-world-generic-market/ 718642/.
150.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
151.
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 96 (2008) ("Patent values vary

considerably across different technologies .... ").
152.
See GASSMANN, REEPMEYER & VON ZEDTWITZ, supra note 22, at 10
(discussing the high risk in pharmaceutical development due to abandonment of
research projects from safety and efficacy concerns rather than merely financial
concerns).
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nonobviousness requirement 153 and instituting the patent linkage
system in the pharmaceutical context. 154 Trends toward weaker
follow-on patents, however, suggest that the current pro-patent
system will stifle rather than promote development in the sciences. 155
U.S. patents might not be as valuable as one would expect because
the patent holder has to contend with any unexpected litigation
arising from patent disputes. 156 Nonetheless, the U.S. pro-patent
system has proved to be effective in producing blockbuster drugs thus
far.

157

Blockbuster drugs typically are successful because they contain
clearly defined claims that are broad in scope and easy to police,
therefore making it difficult for competitors to engineer around the
pharmaceutical compound. 158 In reality, however, few brand
companies are able to turn a profit due to the long gestational period
for drugs. 159 Therefore, once profits are realized, it is tempting and
increasingly common for companies to reinvest in research to develop
160
follow-on or spin-off drugs.
The U.S. pharmaceutical market has been largely successful in
applying a blockbuster business model and is the international leader
in drug innovation. 161 However, the U.S. industry's aggressive
enforcement of patent protection is often construed negatively
because the public equates the pharmaceutical industry with other

153.
See discussion supra Part II.A (describing how courts have recognized the
disparity between technical fields through policy rationales and secondary
considerations).
154.
See discussion supra Part III.A (describing the twin goals of the patent
linkage system in the United States).
155.
See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 102-07 (2008) (discussing how the "pro-patent" orientation of
U.S. jurisprudence might be due to the creation of the specialized Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit).
156.
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 151 (discussing how a badly functioning
property system imposes costs arising from unanticipated disputes).
157.
The high risk and unique nature of the R&D involved in pharmaceutical
development has resulted in American pharmaceuticals accounting for two-thirds of
the worldwide patent value. Id. at 109. Furthermore, over half of the worldwide patent
value is held by large pharmaceutical companies who rely on high-stakes, blockbuster
drugs. See GASSMANN, REEPMEYER & VON ZEDTWITZ, supra note 22, at 4-10 (describing
how large pharmaceutical companies rely on blockbusters to recoup losses from their
high-risk ventures).
158.
See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919,
926-28 (2011) (discussing how chemical and pharmaceutical patents are broad in scope
and "often depict discrete molecular structures, [where] the boundaries are clearly
defined and thus easier to police").
159.
See SCHWEITZER, supra note 4, at 51 (describing how few firms generate
revenue due to the risks of R&D).
160.

Id.

161.

Id. at 21-23.
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manufacturing industries and fails to consider the pharmaceutical
industry's unique research and development requirements. 162 The
high-risk nature of the industry suggests that perhaps there are
significant and legitimate policy reasons for relaxing the
nonobviousness standard in the pharmaceutical context.
On the other hand, the pharmaceutical market has decreased in
competitiveness as the worldwide market has become more
concentrated. 163 As companies merge and top-selling drugs are
clustered among fewer and fewer firms, the market narrows. 164
Additionally, as all countries come into adherence with the TRIPS
agreement, larger generics producers, such as India, are legitimized
and no longer considered to be "outlaws" that profit from counterfeit
production. 165 Thus, the international community faces a serious
question: should the patent system be tightened to the detriment and
perhaps collapse of an established U.S. pharmaceutical market in
order to prevent further monopolization of an already narrowing
international market?
A. Heightening the Nonobviousness Standard
The nonobviousness standard applied by the courts should not be
loosened with respect to the pharmaceutical field, but instead should
become a uniform approach across the entire spectrum of inventions.
The standard in fact already takes account of the need for flexibility
from field to field, as it is judged with respect to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. Anything looser than this approach to
nonobviousness would increase the number of patents granted.
Granting more patents would be an issue because patents are
difficult to contest in court due to a court's presumption that all
patents are valid. 166 The heightened nonobviousness standard also
should include a burden-shifting mechanism that requires the
applicant to demonstrate not that the result was merely
unpredictable, but that there was no suggestion of success. This
standard, when applied in conjunction with a revised patent-termextension regime, should strengthen the integrity of the patent
system by ensuring that patent protection is restricted to legitimate
innovation.

162.
See, e.g., id. at 21-22 (recounting how senators during the Kefauver
hearings would frequently refer to pricing practices of the pharmaceutical industry
while ignoring R&D activities).
163.
Id. at 24.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (mandating that an issued patent shall be presumed
valid).
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In determining whether a combination of prior art elements
would have been obvious, a court must determine whether a
PHOSITA would find a reasonable expectation of success in
combining the elements. 167 In Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 168 the
Federal Circuit held that a pharmaceutical compound stabilized with
besylate salt was obvious with regard to prior art references that
169
discussed the use of the salt as a stabilizer for unrelated drugs.
The court disregarded the fact that the active ingredients were used
to treat unrelated illnesses and instead held that it was enough that
the prior art suggested the use of the salt generally as an agent for
stabilizing, solubilizing, and improving the bioavailability of an active
ingredient. 170 The court was not persuaded by Pfizer's argument that
stabilizers can have varying and unpredictable effects when combined
71
with different active ingredients.'
In coming to its conclusion, the court articulated that a
combination is considered obvious so long as there is a reasonable
probability of success, even if there is some degree of unpredictability
in the art. 172 The court refused to hold that unpredictability should
lead to patentability, reasoning that any such rule would allow the
separate patenting of each combination of an active ingredient and a
stabilizer merely because the properties of each stabilizer would have
to be verified through testing. 173 In this case, there was a "reasonable
probability" of success in combining the drug with one of fifty-three
possible salts listed in the prior art, even if the results for each salt
could not be predicted, because common knowledge and the nature of
the problem itself would suggest the combination. 174 However, the
court did recognize that there must be motivation to do more than
"merely ...try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly
arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave ...no
direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be

167.

[The burden falls on the challenger of the patent to show by clear and
convincing evidence that a skilled artisan would have been motivated
to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the
claimed invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a
reasonable expectation of success in doing so.

Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
168.
Id.
169.
Id. at 1361-64 (holding that there was motivation to combine the stabilizer
with the active ingredient based on the characteristics of the stabilizer generally).
170.
Id. at 1363.
171.
Id. at 1364.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id. at 1362, 1366.
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successful." 175 A "reasonable probability" test as implemented in
Apotex should effectively heighten the nonobviousness standard and
go a long way toward halting the evergreening process.
Apotex's holding that the Pfizer patent was invalid due to
obviousness suggests that the Federal Circuit has begun to shift away
from its pro-patent stance in pharmaceutical innovation. Pfizer's
efforts to optimize drug delivery through the development of an
appropriate stabilizer and other nonactive ingredients required a
significant amount of research. And as Pfizer indicated, the resulting
efficacy of each combination of active and nonactive ingredient was
largely unpredictable. However, the Federal Circuit appears to be
raising the threshold for what is considered nonobvious, clearly
articulating that demonstrating unpredictability is not enough; an
inventor must demonstrate that the prior art, including common
knowledge and the nature of the problem, gave no indication of a
probability of success. 17 6 Although a court still presumes that the
patent is valid, the heightened standard enables a challenging party
to more easily assert that there was a reasonable probability of
success in combining the prior art.
The Federal Circuit's new approach to nonobviousness in the
pharmaceutical context approaches the Indian Patents Act's
definition of inventive step. Under the Patents Act, an inventive step
is accomplished if the invention (1) is not obvious to a PHOSITA, and
177
(2) either has economic significance or involves technical advances.
Thus, under this statute, unpredictability is insufficient to
demonstrate an inventive step. 178 Instead, an invention should reveal
a combination of prior art elements that previously had no suggestion
of success. Where there had been no indication of probability of
success, any success that results would contribute to the

175.
Id. at 1365 (emphasis added) (quoting Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437
F.3d 1157, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176.
In effect, the nonobviousness test proposed in Apotex appears to be a hybrid
of the nonobviousness requirement and a heightened utility requirement. Section 101
of the U.S. Code allows patent protection of a "new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added). This has been interpreted to mean that the
invention must have a "concrete, specific, and real-world use," which is not a difficult
requirement to meet. Francesco De Prospero, The Utility Requirement: When
Undeclared Policy Choices and Epistemological BarriersDerail the System, UNIV. OF
PA. LAW SCH. (Dec. 6, 2011, 3:29 PM), http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/polk/patents/
archives/2011/12/the-utility-req.html. Rather than simply requiring some definable,
practicable use, the court in Apotex read into the nonobviousness standard a
requirement for some sort of beneficial use. That is, the proposed invention must
contribute toward the advancement of the art more than merely adding to it, even if
the success of the invention was unpredictable.
177.
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15, § 2(a)(1)(ja), INDIA CODE, vol. 18.
178.
Id.
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advancement of technology rather than merely being a nonobvious
contribution to the state of the art. The Federal Circuit's shift in the
Apotex decision toward the Indian Patents Act's definition of
inventive step is clear proof that the Federal Circuit has drifted away
from its traditional nonobviousness standard.
The United States should embrace the Apotex holding as the new
standard for nonobviousness and further adopt a burden-shifting test
upon review. If the challenging party can illustrate that the
combination of prior art suggested some probability of success, the
burden will shift to the patent holder to prove that the probability of
success was not reasonable. The patent holder must prove that the
prior art gave no indication of any probability of success.
Here, whether there was any indication of a probability of
success should still be determined from the point of view of the
PHOSITA, with art in this case referencing pharmaceutical
technology. The results of adopting this test are that a manufacturer
could realize the particular frustrations of optimizing a drug
depending on the use of different nonactive ingredients, but an
inventor could not evade obviousness simply by pointing to the
unpredictability of the combination or by suggesting that the
nonactive ingredient was in a different pharmaceutical context, so
long as it was applied in some pharmaceutical context. Although this
proposal heightens the nonobviousness standard through the
"reasonable probability of success" test, the potential combinations of
prior art should still be restricted to those that fall within an
analogous field. Accordingly, Israel's catch-all approach of looking to
even remote fields for prior art should not be followed.
This heightened nonobviousness standard would prevent patent
owners from evergreening their existing patents by obtaining followon patents with therapeutically insignificant contributions to the
state of the art. There would still be a limit to the risk involved in
pharmaceutical research and development through the general
nonobviousness PHOSITA standard; however, the patent owner
should now have to focus on continuing to innovate rather than
simply blocking generic drugs from entering the market. Ultimately,
this will spur genuine innovation and lift the industry out of its
current complacent position. After all, the purpose of the patent
system is to reward individual innovation while ensuring the
continued advancement of the technical field. The goals of the patent
system are only truly realized if the scientific community has
incentive to continue developing the field. At the same time, the
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increased standard should lead to the greater distribution and
179
affordability of drugs in the marketplace.
B. Holding on to Patent-Term Restoration
Despite the promise provided by a heightened nonobviousness
standard, a restriction on patentability alone would likely cause
substantial harm to the U.S. pharmaceutical sector. Alone, such a
standard would strip the U.S. market of a significant portion of its
intellectual property protection and open the door to foreign generics
competition, driving down prices to a point where U.S. manufacturers
cannot compete. And if U.S. companies are unable to quickly recoup
their losses by releasing new blockbuster drugs, a heightened
standard might ultimately lead to the suppression of innovation.
Therefore, the heightened nonobviousness standard should be
implemented in conjunction with a powerful patent-term-extension
program. The coupling of these two tools would weed out patents that
180
s
hamper the industry and instead "promote the progress of science.
Although a patent linkage regime and a corresponding patentterm-extension program are critical to support an innovation-driven
pharmaceutical industry, particularly one that is restricted by the
increased scrutiny of a strict nonobviousness standard, the United
States should not follow in the footsteps of Israel. 181 Although Israel
has both a patent linkage regime and patent-term-restoration
program, both programs are lopsided in favor of generics
manufacturers. 182 While Israeli pharmaceutical manufacturers are
given a safe harbor to execute experimentation for the development of
generics, pioneer patent holders are left with a shadow of a version of
183
the extension program currently in place in the United States.
Such a model might work for a country that is primarily invested in
the generics industry, but the model is inadequate to support the
tremendous risk of pioneering discovery. If anything, the United
States might be better off with a patent-term-extension policy that
provides an even lengthier extension than that already in place in
order to balance the competing interests of a heightened
nonobviousness bar.

See discussion supra Part III (describing the relationship between
179.
distribution and pricing).
8.
180.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
181.
India lacks a patent linkage regime entirely and thus is also not an
appropriate model for the United States. See discussion supra Part III.B (detailing
India's conscious decision to not adopt a linkage regime).
See supra Part III.C for a discussion of Israel's patent linkage regime.
182.
See supra Part III for discussions of both the U.S. and Israeli patent
183.
linkage regimes.
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Scholars criticize the current U.S. patent linkage regime because
of the debilitating effect of patent-term restoration on the pursuit of
novel drugs. 184 However, such criticism is unwarranted. An
assessment of the business strategies of U.S. pharmaceutical
companies reveals that the most successful companies focus their
resources on the development of blockbuster drugs in order to retain
their share of the market and recover the costs of research and
development. 185 Follow-on patents, while certainly a recognizable
portion of a typical company's intellectual property, can just as easily
be obtained by generics manufacturers engaged in research protected
by the Hatch-Waxman Act.' 8 6 Therefore, implementation of a patent
linkage regime is unlikely to result in an increased number of followon patents.
Furthermore, the potential innovation-inhibiting effects of
patent-term restoration are mitigated by the heightened standard for
nonobviousness. Under the proposed burden-shifting standard, fewer
patents for follow-on "inventions" should be granted. Further,
empirical studies suggest a nexus between public health policy and
patent policy, illustrating the importance of a patent linkage regime
in the United States.18 7 Congress has determined that the extension
of patent terms for pharmaceutical technologies is necessary to
promote innovation in the field. 188 Thus, just as a limited monopoly is
warranted in exchange for the disclosure of protected work, an
extended term is necessary to encourage continued investment in
research and development in a field where such investment comes
with very high risk. 189
Conversely, linking regulatory rights to weak patents is
detrimental to the patent system because it blocks generics from
entering the market without adding the benefit of greater innovation.
Instead, the patent owner is awarded for relatively insubstantial
contributions to the field. An ideal policy for avoiding this situation

See Bouchard, supra note 94, at 114 ("[The production of new and
184.
innovative drugs declined over the last decade .... ); Bouchard et al., supra note 13, at
427 (discussing how firms have focused on producing as many follow-on patents as
possible through internal competition);.
See GASSMANN, REEPMEYER & VON ZEDTWITZ, supra note 22, at 4-10
185.
(describing how large pharmaceutical companies rely on blockbusters to recoup losses
from their high risk ventures).
186.
Bouchard et al., supra note 78, at 1467; see also Bouchard et al., supra note
13, at 415 (suggesting that the safe-harbor provision protects generics manufacturers
against infringement while working up their regulatory submissions).
See Bouchard et al., supra note 78, at 1510 (speculating that there is a
187.
"strong legal and functional nexus between public health policy and patent policy").
188.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the Hatch-Waxman
Act's provision for patent-term restoration).
189.
See id. (discussing how there is increased social value in the exchange of
increased up-front investment for a greater reward).
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would not be to limit or eliminate the patent linkage system, but
instead to simply restrict patentability of weaker patents. Under such
a system, pioneer firms would still be motivated to continue their
search for blockbuster drugs with the understanding that they would
receive an extended monopoly that prohibits generics companies from
marketing similar products.
With the two policies operating in tandem, more drugs would be
available for release into the generics market, but companies that
made substantial investments in research and development would be
rewarded for their efforts with the prolonged protection of their
blockbuster drugs. Without these measures, companies are not
motivated to engage in high-risk research. Thus, a system that
embraces a heightened nonobviousness standard similar to that of
India's and Israel's inventive step requirements, while also
maintaining a patent linkage system, would best achieve the goals of
promoting the success of a worldwide pharmaceutical market.

VI. CONCLUSION
Both India and Israel have developed their generics
pharmaceutical market in an effort to better serve their poor
populations. The availability of generics allows for greater access to
medication and necessary healthcare in countries where the majority
of the population would not be able to afford brand pharmaceuticals.
On the other hand, the United States is a wealthy country with a
history of promoting the arts and sciences. Part of what enables the
United States to retain its wealthy status is its ability to excel in
technical advancements. However, the U.S. pharmaceutical market
has lessons to learn from the Indian and Israeli markets.
The United States should modify its current approach to patent
protection of pharmaceuticals. The solution proposed by this Note
provides for a stricter nonobviousness standard for determining
patentability--one that requires more than merely some change away
from the prior art, even if unexpected. However, raising the
nonobviousness bar alone would only result in damage to the
pharmaceutical industry, which would not be able to profit quickly
enough from its narrowed pool of patents to recoup costs incurred
during research and development. Therefore, this Note also proposes
even greater protection through the patent-term-restoration program
established under Hatch-Waxman.
By limiting patentability of weaker pharmaceutical patents
while simultaneously strengthening protection for those patents that
contribute more substantially to advancing the state of the art, the
proposed changes would best further the goals of pharmaceutical
innovation. The proposed policy would shift the volume of patents in
favor of those with a true spark of invention while remaining
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sensitive to the risk-mitigating needs of the industry. As a result, the
United States would maintain a stronghold in the pharmaceutical
sector, and consumers and generics manufacturers would benefit
from the increased availability of low-cost drugs resulting from
incremental changes to the original patents. Only by maintaining a
balance between these two patent policies can the U.S.
pharmaceutical market resume its renowned development of
blockbuster drugs.
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